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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a car crash case which caused injuries to Hansen and property damage to
Roberts' vehicle.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

The case was tried to a jury and a verdict was returned finding both parties
negligent. The jury determined that Hansen was 90 percent at fault and Roberts was 10
percent at fault. The jury awarded damages to Roberts in the amount of$3,776.82.
The case was originally assigned to the Honorable Gregory Anderson until he
retired, shortly before trial. The Honorable Jon Shindurling presided briefly over the case
but assigned the case to the Honorable William H. Woodland for trial. The Honorable
Dane H. Watkins is currently presiding over the case.

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Hansen made a right hand tum into a business parking stall when his vehicle was
struck on the passenger side by Roberts, who attempted to pass Hansen on the right. The
point of impact occurred where the road approached an intersection and started to widen
from a single lane to three lanes: a left tum lane, straight lane, and a right tum lane.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
ISSUE #1: Whether the trial court erred in allowing Roberts to introduce expert
opinion testimony from an accident reconstructionist and biomechanical engineer when

!

(1) Roberts' expert disclosures were untimely and insufficient, (2) the testimony invaded

II

the jury's province, and (3) there was a lack of foundation to support the opinions.

I
,

I1
j

!

ISSUE #2: Whether the court erred by ruling that Hansen waived the right to
object at trial to the introduction of portions of Roberts' deposition.
ISSUE #3: Whether the trial court erred by precluding Hansen from questioning

i

l

I

the voir dire panel regarding employment or association with insurance companies or risk

I

management.

I

i,
j

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I
j

I

ISSUE #1: Expert Testimony

I

A. Exclusion of Witnesses Due to Non-Compliance with Scheduling Order

i
I

and Untimely Discovery Responses

i

j

A trial court has authority to sanction parties for non-compliance with pretrial

f'1

orders. The imposition of sanctions for non-compliance with pretrial orders and untimely

'j

i

i

I

discovery responses is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be

I

overturned absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.

When determining whether a

11

district court abused its discretion, this Court considers three factors: (1) whether the trial

l
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court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal principles, and (3)
whether it reached its decision through an exercise of reason. See Edmunds v. Kraner,
142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006).
B. Admission of Expert Testimony
This Court reviews trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence,
including the testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of discretion standard.
Morris By and Through Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218

(1997). In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, a new trial is merited only
if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties. Id.
ISSUE #2: Error Regarding Waiver of Deposition Objections
This Court reviews errors regarding admissibility of evidence under a harmless
error standard. An error is harmless unless a different result would have been probable
had the error not occurred. See Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 733 P.2d 781
(Idaho Ct. App. 1987) and Idaho R. Civ. P. 61.
ISSUE #3: Voir Dire
The standard of review for a district court's limitations on jury voir dire is an
abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 244, 460 P.2d 374, 379
(1969).
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ARGUMENT
ISSUE #1: The trial court erred in allowing Roberts to introduce expert opinion
testimony from an accident reconstructionist and biomechanical engineer when (1)
Roberts' pretrial expert disclosures were untimely and insufficient, (2) the testimony
invaded the jury's province, and (3) there was a lack of foundation to support the
opinions because they were not scientifically reliable.
A. Roberts' Disclosures Were Untimely and Insufficient
The trial court abused its discretion by allowing Roberts to introduce expert
testimony from expert witnesses when Roberts violated the trial court's scheduling order
and failed to make timely and sufficient pretrial disclosures pursuant to discovery
requests.

"This Court reviews trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence,

including the testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of discretion standard."
Morris By and Through Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218

(1997) and See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006). When
determining whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court considers three
factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2)
whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable
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legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its decision through an exercise of reason.
See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006).
This Court has previously held that a trial court abused its discretion and
committed reversible error by allowing expert testimony that was not properly disclosed
in violation of rule 26. See Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897
(1991). This Court explained in Radmer the purpose of the rule requiring pretrial expert
witness disclosures:
It is fundamental that opportunity be had for full cross-examination, and
this cannot be done properly in many cases without resort to pretrial
discovery, particularly when expert witnesses are involved. . . . Before an
attorney can even hope to deal on cross-examination with an unfavorable
expert opinion he [or she] must have some idea of the bases of that opinion
and the data relied upon. If an attorney is required to await examination at
trial to get this information, he [or she] often will have too little time to
recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the testimony.

Id.
The burden of providing the disclosures is on the party intending to introduce the
testimony. See Clarkv. Klein, 45 P.3d 810 (Idaho 2002). Thus, this Court held in Clark
that the trial court erred by shifting the burden to the adverse party to file a motion to
compel the disclosure when the party introducing the expert testimony failed to make
timely or sufficient disclosures. See id. at n. 1.
Additionally, rule 26(e)(1)(B) requires a party to "seasonably" supplement
discovery responses directed at expert discovery. The trial court may exclude testimony
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offered by a party who failed to seasonably supplement a disclosure. See Idaho R. Civ. P.
26(e)(4).

"[A]n important inquiry in determining whether a response was given

'seasonably' is: was the opposing party given an opportunity for full cross examination?"

Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006).
In making its decision on whether to impose a sanction, the trial court should
request an explanation of the late disclosure, weigh the importance of the testimony in
question, determine the time needed for preparation to meet the testimony, and consider
the possibility of a continuance. See Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 647 P.2d 311
(Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
In this case, the trial court entered a scheduling order requiring each party to
disclose the identity of expert witnesses at least 90 days before trial. See R. Vol. I, p. 34.
The scheduling order precluded either party from conducting discovery after 70 days
before trial and required all discovery to be submitted so that responses would be due
prior to the discovery cutoff date. See R. p. 35 and n.2.
The following time line shows relevant expert discovery and disclosure dates:
November 23, 2009 - Hansen Serves Rule 26(b)(4) Interrogatory on Roberts. See
R. Vol. I, p. 1.
July 21, 2010 - Expert Witness Identity Disclosure Deadline. See R. Vol. I, p. 34.
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July 21, 2010 - Roberts Discloses Scott Kimbrough as Potential Expert Witness.

See R. Vol. I, p. 38.
August 9,2010 - Discovery Cutoff. See R. Vol. I, p. 34.
August, 2010- Roberts Retains Scott Kimbrough. See Tr. Vol. I, p. 379, LL. 1725.
September 24, 2010 - Roberts Provides Partial Rule 26(b)(4) Answer to
Interrogatory for Scott Kimbrough. See R. Vol. I, p. 86.
September 29,2010 - Roberts Hires John Droge. See R. Vol. I, p. Ill.
October 1, 2010 - Roberts Discloses John Droge to Hansen. See R. Vol. I, p. 111.
October 4,2010 - Roberts Provides Partial Rule 26(b)(4) Answer to Interrogatory
for John Droge. See R. Vol. I, p. 119.
October 19, 2010 - Roberts Provides Hansen with Scene Diagram Created by
Scott Kimbrough. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 359, LL. 8-10.
October 19,2010 - Trial. See R. Vol. I, p. 34.
Prior to the examination by Roberts of his expert witnesses, Hansen sought
exclusion of the experts. The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury.
During the hearing, Hansen's counsel informed the court of the late and incomplete
disclosures. Hansen's counsel pointed out to the court that the disclosures only came a
couple of weeks before trial and that they did not include a disclosure of compensation,
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prior cases in which they had testified at trial or deposition, and in Droge's case, the basis
of his opinions or the data he used to support his opinions. See Tr. Vol. 1., pp. 328-332.
Roberts' counsel noted that Hansen did seek rule 26(b)(4) disclosures but
suggested that her disclosures were timely even though they were made just before trial
and well past the expert disclosure deadlines imposed by the court's scheduling order.
See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 332, LL. 13-25 through p. 333, L. 23. Roberts' counsel argued that

Hansen should have filed a motion to compel or a motion in limine to address the issue at
a prior time. See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 333, LL. 16-23.
The trial court listened to arguments of counsel and then summarily ruled that the
experts would testifY:
THE COURT: All right. They will be allowed to testifY.
MR. GORDON: Based on what, the identity of Dr. Droge? He wasn't even told we didn't even know untilTHE COURT: Your objection is noted.
Tr. Vol. I., p. 338, LL. 10-16.
As noted above, a trial court abuses its discretion by failing to (1) perceive the
issue as one of discretion, (2) act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with applicable legal principles, and (3) reach its decision through an exercise of reason.
The trial court failed on all three accounts. The trial court's conclusory ruling does not
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satisty its obligation to perceive the issues as one of discretion, provide the parties or this
Court any indication that it reached it's decision through an exercise of reason, or
determine whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal principles. Instead, the parties and this Court are left to speculate as to
the reasoning behind the trial court's ruling.
To the extent the trial court relied on Roberts' counsel's argument that the burden
was on Hansen to file a motion to compel, that reasoning clearly violates the second
prong of the abuse of discretion test. See Clark v. Klein, 45 P.3d 810, 814 n. 1 and 815
(Idaho 2002) (holding that trial judge's decision to allow expert testimony despite
untimely rule 26(b)(4) disclosures failed the second part of test by indicating "that the
burden was on Appellants to file a motion to compel the substance of the testimony.").
Further, as this Court pointed out in Edmunds, the trial court should determine
whether the discovery responses were "seasonably" supplemented by affording Hansen
with an opportunity for full cross examination.

This Court in Edmunds held that a

supplemental disclosure made eight months before trial was not an abuse of discretion
because it gave the opposing party an opportunity to undertake additional discovery and
prepare a cross examination.

Unlike the disclosing party in Edmunds, Roberts'

supplemental discovery providing partial 26(b)(4) disclosures did not come until after the
discovery cutoff deadline and just weeks before trial.
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Particularly disturbing was the production of a scene diagram created by
Kimbrough and produced on the day of trial. The trial court admitted the diagram into
evidence without any explanation or reasoning supporting its ruling. See Tr. Vol. I., p.
359, LL. 6-11.

The trial court abused its discretion by summarily ruling that Roberts' experts
could testifY when the trial court failed to (1) perceive the issue as one of discretion, (2)
act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal
principles, and (3) reach its decision through an exercise of reason.

The case law

provided by Hansen shows similar examples where this Court has found an abuse of
discretion when trial courts admit expert testimony when the disclosures were untimely
and violated the trial court's scheduling order or were made shortly before trial. This
Court has noted that untimely disclosures preclude the opposing party from preparing an
effective cross examination of the witness. A new trial is warranted because the trial
court's abuse of discretion affected a substantial right of Hansen - the ability to
effectively prepare a cross-examination of Roberts' expert witnesses.

Accordingly,

Hansen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and remand the case to
the trial court for a new trial.
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B. Kimbrough Invaded the Province of the Jury
The trial court erred in allowing Kimbrough to testifY about whether Hansen or
Roberts were negligent because it is inappropriate to allow an expert to provide testimony
on subjects that are not beyond the common sense of the average juror. Expert testimony
is allowed if it will assist the trier of fact. See Idaho R. Evid. 702. However, expert
testimony is not allowed where the normal experience and qualifications of lay jurors
permit them to draw proper conclusions from given facts and circumstances.

See

Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 647; 39 P.3d 577, 588 (Idaho 2001) and State v.
Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 695; 760 P.2d 27,34 (Idaho 1988) (noting that expert testimony is

not admissible if the expert is not better equipped than a lay person). Further, an expert
may not enter the realm of fact-finding that is well within the capacity of a lay jury and
render an opinion regarding the weight of disputed evidence. See State v. Hester, 114
Idaho 688,696; 760 P.2d 27,35 (Idaho 1988).
Kimbrough testified that the accident was caused by Hansen's careless right hand
turn. See Ir. Vol. I., p. 357, LL. 14-17. Kimbrough developed his opinion by reading the
police report, reading Hansen's deposition, looking at the accident site on Google Earth,
visiting the accident site, and speaking with an ex-highway patrolman. See Ir. Vol. I., p.
356, L. 7 through p. 357, L. 4. Kimbrough testified that his opinions were based on his
personal weighing of the evidence. See Ir. Vol. I., p. 374 L. 15 through p. 375, L. 15.
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Kimbrough testified that he is no better than the jury in weighing the evidence. See Ir.
Vol. I., p. 375, LL. 5-15. Kimbrough testified that Roberts' conduct was reasonable and
that Hansen's conduct was not reasonable. See Ir. Vol. I., p. 369, L. 19 through p. 370,
L. 22.
Jurors are presumably drivers or have driven in cars and are adequately qualified
to determine whether Hansen or Roberts' actions are negligent. Kimbrough did nothing
beyond review the evidence that was presented to the jurors to reach his conclusions.
Kimbrough's testimony did not assist the jury to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in the case. Instead, his testimony was, admittedly, simply his own interpretation
of the facts after he personally weighed the evidence. Kimbrough admitted that the jury
was just as qualified as him to come to its own conclusions regarding the fault of the
parties.

Accordingly, the trial court erred by admitting Kimbrough's own personal

opinions about the fault of the parties since his testimony was within the normal
experience and qualifications of lay jurors.
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that the admissibility of
expert testimony is a matter of discretion, by failing to act within the outer boundaries of
that discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and reach its decision
through the exercise of reason. As was the case for the late disclosures, the trial court
made a conclusory ruling that Kimbrough could testifY so there was no acknowledgment
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by the trial court that the ruling was a matter of discretion and there was no record that
the trial court reached its decision through the exercise of reason. Further, the trial court
did not act consistent with applicable legal standards because expert testimony is not
admissible to testifY regarding the negligence of drivers involved in an automobile crash.
This Court should vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial because
the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Kimbrough's testimony. A new trial is
warranted because the trial court's abuse of discretion affected a substantial right of
Hansen - the ability to have the case decided by a jury of peers without an invasion of the
jury's province by Roberts' paid expert.
C. Droge's Testimony was not Scientifically Reliable
The trial court erred in allowing Droge testifY because Roberts failed to provide
adequate foundation that Droge's testimony was scientifically reliable. Expert testimony
is only admissible if it is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
and will assist the trier of fact. See Idaho R. Evid. 702.
To detennine whether scientific knowledge will assist the trier of fact, a trial court
must make a two-step inquiry: (1) detennine that the underlying scientific principles are
reliable and (2) detennine that the scientific principles or methodology were properly
applied by the expert. See State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520,522; 81 P.3d 1230, 1232 (Idaho
2003) (noting that a trial court must make a "preliminary assessment of whether the
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reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.").
For example, this Court found that expert testimony regarding polygraph test
results was not admissible and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
test results because polygraph testing was not shown to be scientifically reliable. See id.
at 524-25, and 1234-35. So in Perry, the first step of the inquiry - showing that the
underlying scientific principles were reliable - was not established.
In State v. Williamson, 144 Idaho 597, 600; 166 P.3d 387, 390 (Idaho Ct. App.
2007), the court of appeals held that laser speed detection devices are scientifically
reliable. It made that determination based, in part, on case law from other jurisdictions
accepting the reliability of laser speed detection. However, the court of appeals noted
that the State still had to meet the second step of admissibility by showing that the officer
using a laser device was qualified, that the unit was properly maintained, and that it was
used correctly. Id.
Biomechanical engineering is not necessarily scientifically reliable. In 2008, the
Nevada Supreme Court, after affirming the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony by
a biomechanical engineer, noted that, unlike radar detection devices, it was not aware of
any jurisdiction that had judicially noticed the general reliability of biomechanical
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engineering or its ability to assess the cause of personal injuries in automobile accidents.

See Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 653 (Nev. 2008).
On the contrary, the Nevada Supreme Court cited to a number of cases that
excluded testimony from a biomechanical engineer because it was not reliable. One case
that is highly relevant is Reali v. Mazda Motor ofAm., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me.
2000).

In Reali, the court excluded a biomechanical engineer's testimony regarding

accident forces because the court found that the methodology used to determine the
forces was unreliable.

The biomechanical engineer determined that the Delta V, or

change in velocity of the vehicle, was 12 m.ph. Knowing the change in velocity would
allow the engineer to calculate the forces imposed on a passenger in the vehicle and then
render an opinion whether those forces were sufficient to cause an injury.

The

biomechanical engineer derived the Delta V by assumptions made from viewing
photographs of the damaged automobile. The court found that no evidence was presented
to show that eyeballing property damage photographs was an acceptable method to derive
Delta V.
In this case, Roberts did not lay the foundation showing that biomechanical
engineering is scientifically reliable.

Instead, Roberts merely asked Droge what

biomechanical engineering was and whether he had a degree in biomechanical
engineering. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 392 L. 13 through p. 393, L. 9. Thus, Roberts did not lay
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a foundation to meet the first step of the analysis - to show that biomechanical
engmeerIng is scientifically reliable in determining the causation of injuries in car
crashes.
It became clear as Droge's testimony developed that he made an unscientific and
subjective determination of changes of velocity based on eyeballing photographs. Droge
admits that he made a subjective guess of the accident forces (a function of Delta V or
change of velocity) by simply eyeballing the property damage photographs and reviewing
the repair damage estimates. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 391, LL. 3-5; p. 398, LL. 17-20; p. 399,
LL. 14-15; p. 414, LL. 7-15 (the change of velocity is an estimate based on damage to the
vehicles). Droge made all other determinations of speeds or angles of the vehicles and
other unknowns from his initial gut feeling regarding the change of velocity. See Tr. Vol.

1., p. 417 LL. 6-7 (you take this change of velocity, and we're working to other
unknowns). Droge then stated that he compared his eyeball guess to a database of 70,000
other car crashes and "believed" that he found 2 crashes that supported his guess but did
not provide any details of the crashes. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 419, LL. 1-2.
At the end of the day, all Droge did was eyeball photos of the vehicles and make
a guess as to what kind of forces were involved in the crash and, not surprisingly, he
found that the forces were insufficient to cause an injury. As noted in Reali, eyeballing a
couple of photographs is not sufficient to lay a foundation to show that the testimony is
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scientifically reliable. Further, like Hallmark, Roberts did not offer any evidence that
biomechanics is a recognized field of expertise, that Droge's opinion was capable of
being tested or that it had been tested, that Droge's theories had been published or
subjected to peer review, or that his opinions were accepted to any degree in the scientific
community. Finally, Droge formed his opinions without knowing the vehicles' starting
positions, their speeds at impact, the length of time that the vehicles were in contact
during impact, or the angle at which the vehicles collided - these are all admittedly
unknowns and his calculations of these unknowns are all derived from his initial guess of
the change of velocity. See Tr. Vol. L, p. 399, LL. 14-15.
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that the admissibility
of expert testimony is a matter of discretion, by failing to act within the outer boundaries
of that discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and reach its decision
through the exercise of reason. The trial court made a conclusory ruling that Droge's
testimony was admissible so there was no acknowledgment by the trial court that the
ruling was a matter of discretion and there was no record that the trial court reached its
decision through the exercise of reason. Further, the trial court did not act consistent with
applicable legal standards because expert testimony is not admissible unless the trial
court makes a two-step inquiry to ensure that underlying scientific principles are reliable
and were properly applied.
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foundation for Droge's testimony. This Court should vacate the judgment and remand
the case for a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Droge's
testimony. A new trial is warranted because the trial court's abuse of discretion affected
a substantial right of Hansen - the right to have the case decided by admissible evidence
and not unreliable and unscientific guesses.

ISSUE #2:

The trial court erred in ruling that Hansen waived the

objections he made during Roberts' video deposition.
The trial court erred when it ruled that Hansen waived the objections he made
during Roberts' video deposition by not addressing those objections during a scheduled
hearing to review jury instructions.

A party may object at the trial to receiving in

evidence any deposition for any reason which would require the exclusion of the
evidence if the witness were then present and testifying. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 32(b).
Roberts' video deposition was taken for purposes of trial. During the deposition,
Hansen's counsel raised a number of objections during the deposition and Roberts'
counsel raised a number of objections during Hansen's cross examination of Roberts.
Roberts' counsel agreed at the conclusion of the deposition to provide the trial court with
a copy of the deposition transcript and review the objections prior to trial so she could
edit the video deposition to remove inadmissible testimony.

See Tr. Vol. I., p. 259.

Instead, Roberts' counsel submitted a motion to address only her objections, along with a
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request for an expedited hearing on her motion to combine it with a previously scheduled
hearing to review jury instructions. See Tr. Vol. I., pp. 259-62.
When the issue of Hansen's objections were raise at trial, the trial court ruled
that the hearing was scheduled "for the sole purpose of editing that particular trial
deposition." Tr. Vol. I., p. 260, LL. 20-22. The trial court ruled that Hansen's counsel
waived any objections during the jury instructions hearing by not addressing them at the
hearing. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 260, L. 13 and p. 263, LL. 1-8.
Hansen's counsel raised the issue again shortly before the deposition was played
for the jury. Hansen's counsel argued that rule 32(b) allowed a party to raise objections
to a deposition at trial. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 286, LL. 8-14. The trial court indicated that he
had gone back over the record of the jury instruction hearing and "I did specifically ask

Mr. Ipsen about any objections from plaintiffs side, and he specifically said nothing
from the plaintiff." Tr. Vol. I., p. 286, LL. 15-19.
Contrary to the trial court's memory and its subsequent review of the record,
Hansen's counsel did not waive the right to raise objections to Roberts' deposition
testimony during the jury instructions hearing. After addressing Roberts' objections, the
following exchange took place at the jury instruction hearing:

THE COURT: Okay, all right. Now does that include everything? We covered
everything on your motion?
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MS. BRIZEE: We've covered everything on my motion.
THE COURT: All right. You had not filed a motion, Mr. Ipsen?

MR. IPSEN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I didn't think there was anything there from the plaintiffs. We had
scheduled a jury trial conference as well. Are you both ready to do that?

See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 249, L. 16 through p. 250, L. 1.
The record shows that Hansen's counsel did not walve any objections to
Roberts' deposition and it shows that the hearing was not conducted for the sole purpose
of addressing objections to the deposition. Instead, the hearing was scheduled to review
jury instructions. During the hearing, the trial court did not specifically ask Mr. Ipsen
"about objections from plaintiffs side" and Mr. Ipsen did not specifically say "nothing
from the plaintiff." Instead, the trial court specifically asked Mr. Ipsen, "You had not
filed a motion?" Mr. Ipsen specifically answered, "No."
The trial court erred because Hansen was not required to file a motion to address
his objections because rule 32(b) permits a party to make objections to depositions at trial
and Hansen's counsel did not waive his objections at the jury instruction hearing.
A substantial amount of inadmissible evidence was introduced based on the trial
court's erroneous ruling that Hansen waived his deposition objections. First, Roberts
made hearsay statements regarding the amount of money the collision repair company
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said it would cost to repair his vehicle, along with the written repair estimates. See Tr.
Vol. I., pp. 299-302.

Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the rules of

evidence. See Idaho R. Evid. 802. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testitying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. See Idaho R. Evid. 801 (c).
Receipts for repair work are inadmissible hearsay. See State v. Miller, 141 Idaho
148, 150; 106 P.3d 474 (Idaho 2004) and Marshall v. Bare, 107 Idaho 201, 204; 687 P.2d
591, 594 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). Both of the foregoing cases hold that repair estimates
are hearsay. In Marshall, a party attempted to circumvent the hearsay rule by arguing
that the repair estimates were not offered for the truth of the matter.

The Court of

Appeals disagreed and pointed out that if the repair estimates were not introduced for the
truth of the matter then they would be inadmissible as irrelevant. Other jurisdictions have
issued similar opinions in cases involving the introduction of repair estimates for vehicle
damage. See Home Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Hagar, 242 Ark. 693,415 S.W.2d 65
(1967) and In the Interest ofJ T., 285 Ga. App. 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
Second, hearsay statements made by Roberts to Hansen, police dispatch, and
oral and written statements to the police officer were inadmissible. See Tr. Vol. I., pp.
310-14. Roberts' counsel was under the mistaken belief that statements by her own client
were not hearsay. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 310, LL. 24-25. The rule is that statements by a
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party-opponent are not hearsay. See Idaho R. Evid. 801(d). None of Roberts' statements
to Hansen, dispatch, or the police officer, including his written statement, are admissible
because they are hearsay.
Finally, Roberts' testimony that he did not receive a citation is inadmissible and
violated the trial court's prior ruling on the issue. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 315, LL. 16-21. The
trial court ordered before trial that there would be no testimony "concerning admission of
citation. In other words, the parties will not testifY that there was a citation." See Tr.
Vol. I., p. 51, LL. 18-23. Roberts' testimony that he did not receive a citation violates the
court's pretrial order because it implies that Hansen received a citation since most jurors
will believe that one of the drivers will get a citation.
The trial court's error was not harmless because without the hearsay evidence
regarding the repair estimates Roberts would not have had any evidence at all to support
his damages so he would not have been awarded anything even if the jury found Hansen
primarily at fault.

Although Hansen only needs to show a probable change in the

outcome of the trial due to the trial court's error, the lack of any evidence other than
inadmissible hearsay to prove Roberts' damages would certainly have changed the
outcome of trial.
Further, the hearsay evidence regarding statements made by Roberts to the
police officer along with his statement that he did not get a citation would probably have
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changed the jury's apportionment of fault and either reduced Hansen's liability to Roberts
or swung the jury all the way to Hansen's side.

Importantly, the jury initially was

considering apportioning fault 51149 but, implicit in its question to the court, it wanted to
give Roberts some money. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 491 L. 22 through p. 492, L. 4. The jurors
sent the following question to the court during deliberations:
If we decide that Larry [Hansen] is 51 percent and Matt [Roberts] is 49
percent, would Matt still get the award amount of damages as if we did 90
percent to 10 percent. Period or question mark. In other words, does the
percentage matter?

Id.
Further, only nine jurors signed the special verdict form. See R Vol. I, p. 206.
Swaying one or two more jurors to Hansen's side or arming the pro-Hansen jurors with
additional arguments, while at the same time reducing arguments for the pro-Roberts
jurors, would probably have changed the dynamics of deliberations so that the jury
apportioned more fault on Roberts than Hansen and either reduced Hansen's liability to
Roberts or resulted in a recovery by Hansen from Roberts. Accordingly, the error was
not harmless.
ISSUE #3: Limitations on Voir Dire
The trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Hansen from inquiring whether
a prospective juror or one of his family members were or had ever been employed by an
insurance carrier. The standard of review for a district court's limitations on jury voir
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dire is an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 244, 460 P.2d
374,379 (1969).
Voir dire is an important tool available to the parties to ensure that a fair and
impartial jury is impaneled. Accordingly, this Court has held that "some latitude must be
given in the matter of examining jurors on their voir dire, to enable counsel to determine
whether or not such jurors should be challenged for implied bias, and also for obtaining
information as to whether or not it is desirable to exercise a peremptory challenge." See
Wilson v. St. Joe Boom Co., 34 Idaho 253,262; 200 P. 884, 886 (Idaho 1921).

This Court has noted that a potential juror may be biased due to his employment.
"It is the privilege of a party within reasonable limits and good faith, to ascertain the

occupation of a juror and the extent of his possible interest in the trial." Byington v.
Horton, 61 Idaho 389, 102 P.2d 652 (Idaho 1940).

In injury cases, this Court has repeatedly held that it is the privilege of the plaintiff
to inquire whether a prospective juror or one of his family members are or have ever been
employed by an insurance carrier. See Wilson v. St. Joe Boom Co., 34 Idaho 253, 262;
200 P. 884, 886 (Idaho 1921) (holding that prospective jurors are subject to inquiry
regarding their interest in a casualty company); Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654, 664;
203 P. 289, 292 (Idaho 1921) (holding that counsel may ascertain whether jurors have
interest in the result of litigation although it might show juror's connection with a
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casualty company); Bressan v. Herrick, 35 Idaho 217, 221; 205 P. 555, 556 (Idaho 1922)
(permitting counsel in personal injury action to ask jurors whether they had any
connection with casualty companies); Faris v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 48 Idaho
310, 322; 282 P. 72 (Idaho 1929) (holding that statements of counsel that defendant was
insured were not prejudicial); Shaddy v. Daley, 58 Idaho 536, 540; 76 P.2d 279, 281
(Idaho 1938) (holding that plaintiff was within his rights in propounding question as to
whether prospective juror is or has been employed by an insurance company); Byington
v. Horton, 61 Idaho 389, 395; 102 P.2d 652, 654 (Idaho 1940) (same); and Owen v.
Burcham, 100 Idaho 441,599 P.2d 1012 (Idaho 1979) (same).
In Byington, each prospective juror was asked whether he or any member of his
family had been employed by any insurance company engaged in the business of insuring
against automobile accidents. This Court found the line of question proper and quoted
from a prior decision holding, "It is entirely proper for counsel to ask the jurors such
questions as may reasonably be necessary to ascertain whether they are free from a bias
or interest that may affect their verdict. To this end it is proper for counsel in good faith,
to ask of each juror whether he is interested as an agent or stockholder or otherwise in a
specified casualty company." (quoting Faris).
More recently, this Court reiterated that an inquiry concerning prospective jurors
and their family members' employment or ownership interest in a casualty company is
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pennissible. "We have held that such inquiry is permissible if made in good faith with
the intent to expose bias and not for the purpose of informing the jury about the existence
of the defendant's insurance." Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441,599 P.2d 1012 (Idaho
1979).
Notably, every time this issue is raised on appeal, it has been raised by the defense
when the trial court has allowed such inquiries.

This case raises an issue of first

impression before this Court because in this case the trial court prohibited such inquiries.
The Idaho Court of Appeals suggested, in dicta, that trial judges in Idaho are free
to prohibit this line of questioning, relying on Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 831;
828 P.2d 854, 860. See Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 907; 120 P.3d 289, 296 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2005). The Court of Appeals' statement should not be adopted by this Court for
two reasons: First, the Court of Appeals' reliance on Kozlowski was misplaced because
the inquiry in Kozlowski was not whether a juror had an interest in an insurance company
as an employee or stockholder, which would make the juror incompetent to serve as a

juror.

Instead, the inquiry in Kozlowski related to the jurors' exposure to anti-tort

advertising campaigns, which would not necessarily give rise to a cause challenge. The
Court of Appeals did not explain in Harris how a party could exercise their right to
exclude incompetent jurors or effectively exercise peremptory challenges if questioning
regarding jurors' interests in insurance companies was prohibited.
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Second, the dicta in Harris seems driven by remarks in that particular case by
plaintiffs counsel singling out a specific insurance company. See Harris, at 295. While
the Court of Appeals' concerns are legitimate, the statement that trial courts can prohibit
all inquiries into incompetency due to employment with an insurance carrier goes too far.
Indeed, this Court's holdings on the subject already state that inquiries into employment
by an insurance carrier are appropriate so long as they are not intended to signal that
insurance is available. A simple question as to whether a juror or a juror's close family
members have ever worked for an insurance company is innocuous, yet it provides
plaintiffs with information necessary to determine whether a juror is competent or biased.
In this case, Roberts moved for an order in limine prohibiting any use of the word
insurance.

Hansen's counsel objected at oral argument and argued that inquiry into

prospective jurors' interests in insurance companies during voir dire was appropriate.
"[S]pecificaUy, I'm thinking that if there is an insurance adjuster or someone who works
in the insurance industry who is on the jury, I'm not sure if my client would get a fair
trial." Tr. Vol. I, p. 22 L. 22 through p. 23, L. 5. The trial court ruled that knowledge of
the prospective jurors and their spouses' current employment was sufficient to address
counsel's concerns.
Hansen's counsel again raised the issue of voir dire on the day of trial, seeking
some latitude to inquire about jurors' interests in insurance companies. "Questions I
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would like to explore would be the person's job history with regard to whether they ever
worked in risk management, insurance claims as an agent or insurance adjuster, [or]
whether they've had close family members or friends who work in the Insurance
industry." Tr. Vol. I, p. 66, LL. 6-17. The trial court again denied this request.
Accordingly, Hansen was precluded from learning whether a juror had previously
worked in the insurance industry or whether other close family members - such as
parents, children, or siblings - had ever been employed in the insurance industry.
Also, consider that a juror may have been improperly removed for cause solely
because she worked for Allstate. Voir dire of prospective juror, Ms. Hix, comprised all
of three lines in the transcript. See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 71, LL. 21-24. The restriction on
mentioning insurance precluded Hansen's counsel from inquiring whether Ms. Hix
worked in claims or for an agent.

The distinction is important because views and

attitudes of employees in claims, whose job is to minimize liability, is significantly
different than those who work as agents, whose job it is to extol the virtues and benefits
of insurance to customers and prospective customers.

Hansen was precluded from

determining Ms. Hix's views on automobile insurance claims and whether she could
fairly and impartially decide the case. Instead, Hansen had to presume that she was
incompetent solely because she worked for Allstate so he moved the court to remove her

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

28

for cause. Roberts' counsel did not object and the trial court removed Ms. Hix for cause
with no examination from defense counsel. See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 102, LL. 5-13.
If the trial court presumed that Ms. Hix was incompetent to serve as a juror solely
because she worked for an insurance company, it is safe to believe that a juror who
formerly worked for an insurance company could also be biased against plaintiffs.
Similarly, a juror whose mother or father worked as an insurance agent may also be
biased against plaintiffs.

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred when it

prohibited Hansen from ascertaining whether potential jurors or their spouses had any
prior employment with an insurance company or whether any of their close family
members were currently or previously employed with an insurance company. The error
was prejudicial because it prevented Hansen from eliciting bias so that he could
effectively challenge jurors for cause or so he could better utilize his peremptory
challenges.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Hansen requests that this Court vacate the judgment in
favor of Roberts and remand to the trial court for a new trial.
DATED this 19th day of January, 2012.

Brent Gordon
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